

New Culture Forum
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Immigration: Britain's Biggest Issue

Becoming a minority? Low birth rates, high migration
and population change.



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Is minority status inevitable for ‘indigenous’ populations in the developed world?

Implicit in current trends in Western Europe, and in the Anglosphere:

Low and falling domestic fertility

Gap between immigrant and native total fertility (TF).

Constant or rising immigration, seemingly perpetual

Foreign origin population now over 20% and rising.

In UK, no articulate political opposition. But dissent elsewhere.

Elite indifference.

Cohort shift in opinion - open views among younger generations.

But not in Eastern Europe, East Asia.

‘So what?’ (Sajid Javid, former British Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, September 2023)

Low fertility

Below replacement throughout developed world.

In East Asia an economic and social existential threat.

Extinction forecasts.


And now a further step downwards.

A real change: Large countries with TF below replacement –altogether over half the world's population, over one hundred countries.

Bangladesh	2.08	Mexico	1.73
Brazil	1.75	Russia	1.6
China	1.30	India	2.07
All EU	1.62	Japan	1.39
Iran	1.92	Turkey	1.91
Indonesia	1.99	USA	1.84

*Nerds' corner: replacement fertility **varies with the death** rate; it's not fixed at 2.1.*

The worst case – East Asia (Korea *et al.*) (but not much immigration).




East Asian apocalypse? – not quite yet.

‘There is a great deal of ruin in a nation.’ Adam Smith, 1777.

Korea: extinction threatened by 2750


Japan: down to the last Japanese by 3000.

Source: National Institute for Social Security and Population Research, Japan.




Southern Europe: another low fertility region.

Here with overwhelmingly high immigration



Of course we're not like that.


Total Fertility, components of the UK 1945 - 2023. Source: ONS



Instead, two groups of 'higher' fertility countries.

Total Fertility trends, UK, Northern Europe and 'Neo-Europes' 1950 - 2022
(unweighted means)


Sources: Council of Europe, Eurostat and National Statistical Yearbooks



unprecedented low levels. e .g UK 1.49, Finland 1.35.


Total Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2018

Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks



But birth rates can go up as well as down. Central and East Europe, recovery of total fertility to 2022.

Total Fertility trends, Selected Eastern and Central European countries
1948 - 2022



But...

TF is a very convenient indicator, but a volatile one (very sensitive to the timing of births).

What's going on?

An uneven decline – e.g. France little affected (TF 1.84 in 2021).

Practical problems

Response to economic crises from 2008, Covid 2019 and Ukraine war 2022 (Matysiak et al 2021.) Therefore temporary?

Housing and childcare costs.

Ageing - more caregiving of elderly, reduces desire for children among carers.

Systemic job insecurity (D'Ambrosio et al. 2023, Fleckenstein et al.2023, Peng 2012,Ranan 1999),

Value shifts :in England huge increase 5% to 20% in young people not wanting children'.

Concern about climate change and the future for children

Lower trust, lower morale, arising from greater diversity .


See https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics

Demographers puzzled. Some gurus speak:

(‘frankly I haven’t a clue’)


- “*In Scandinavia we thought they got it right, there was a very comprehensive package, focused on gender equality, that ticks all the boxes, and in the past year fertility is going down. **So we are scratching our heads and trying to work out what’s going on,***” Anne Gauthier. The Guardian 4 March 2020.
- ‘*It is particularly puzzling given that these countries used to be seen as the prime examples for the premise that ensuring the compatibility of work and family and having generous child support systems will result in relatively high fertility levels... **Demography is still groping in the dark for explanations for these changes.*** Wolfgang Lutz, (2020) p.67.

‘Flow’: Population change: from emigration to mass migration. ‘Net migration, UK 1964 – 2022 (1000s).




‘Stock’: Percent of population of England and Wales born outside UK, 1841 – 2011.

England and Wales 1841 - 2011, percent born outside UK. Source: Census 1841 - 2011
(n.b. there was no census in 1941).




Percent of UK population born abroad 1841-2021.

England and Wales 1841-2021. Percent of population born outside UK.




Non-white population, Great Britain 1951-2020 (1000s).



Immigrant fertility. *Some groups persistently higher.*

Sources: SOPEMI, national statistical offices.




The power of migration

UK projections (millions) to 2086 of net migration from zero
to 600,000 with $TF = 1.53$


Projected population of the UK 2021-2086 (millions) at various levels of net migration.

TFR = 1.53. Assumes 51% female, 49% male.



There are consequences

Ethnic change in the UK: percent of population in three ethnic categories 2006 – 2066 (net migration 180k). *(Source: Coleman, Population and Development Review 2010)*




Slower transformation even if migration ends: UK 2006 – 2056.

TFR = 1.84, net immigration = zero or 180,000 / year.

Source: Coleman 2010.


FIGURE 4a Percent of population in three major ethnic categories 2006–2056, standard scenario and natural change scenario



Ethnic change – the USA first. projected 2010-2050

Population projections of the United States by race and Hispanic origin, 2010 - 50 (percent).


Source: US Census Bureau 2008. Note - persons with more than one origin not included (3% in 2050).



Netherlands 2003 - 2050.

Percent of population of foreign origin, medium variant and zero-migration projections.


Netherlands 2005- 2050. Percent of population of foreign origin ('Western' and 'non-Western') with and without migration. Source: CBS.



Comparison of projections of foreign-origin populations in Europe

(percent of total population 2000 – 2050).


Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as percent of total population.



Sweden's last ethnic forecast.

Percent foreign background, 2000-2060

Sweden foreign origin population 2000 - 2060 as percent of total
Sources: Statistics Sweden 2003, 2004b.



Selected EU countries 2011-61. Proportion of population with 'foreign background'

Percent of national population with
foreign background'.

	2011	2061
Austria	21	54
Spain	21	49
Belgium	20	48
Germany	18	45
Italy	13	40
United Kingdom	17	40
Sweden	19	39
Denmark	14	36
Ntherlands	16	31
France	16	22
Poland	6	7

Do governments respond?

In UK, no powerful anti-immigration political party.

Apathy and resignation among electorate?

Indifference or approval by elites.

Pervasive bias by BBC and pressure groups.

Self-censorship by media and publishers

Influence of TV especially adverts

Discouragement of discussion by official bodies

Growth of voting noncitizen minorities.

Tipping point passed?

So what?

Why should we worry if 'whites' cease to be majority ?

Self-evident in respect of indigenous populations abroad: *San, Guarani, Yanomami, Komi, Bayaka, Sami...*

Priority entitlement of natives over immigrants?

Group self-protection?

Unfair deprivation of inheritance?

Erosion of a culture?

Loss of power and coherence ?

Problems of diversity (trust, solidarity)

Or – it does not matter.

Some moderating factors

Growth of religions.

Recruitment to majority of products of interethnic unions.

Inter-generation ethnic drift to ‘white’ (if a little brownish).


People of mixed origins become biggest ‘group’.

(partly after Eric Kaufmann 2010)

Uncertainty: Probabilistic projections of the UK – average outcome for major groups (percent).


Source: Coleman and Scherbov 2005

UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.



Uncertainty – probabilistic projection of the White population, 2001-2100.

Source: Coleman and Scherbov 2005



Uncertainty – probabilistic projection of the UK ‘Mixed’ population 2001-2100.

Source: Coleman and Scherbov 2005

The faces of the future?

