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How demographic change affects politics



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‘In the multitude of the people is the King’s
honour; but in the want of people is the
destruction of the Prince.’

Proverbs XIV 28

Population change affects policy through inequalities (in the broad sense)

Demographic transition and its mismatches in timing, including overshoot to low sub-replacement fertility, leads to:

Changes in internal and international balance of numbers

Population ageing, economic risks and the conflicting interests of young and old.


International migration its profits, loss and discontents.

Demographic and democratic transitions connected.

Political response a semi-random process.


The demographic future is not European (smaller, older)....

Population estimates and projections, selected countries 1950-2050. UN 2008-based medium variant projections



All change in Europe's pecking order?

Projected population, 2015 - 2080, selected European countries
(millions). Source: Eurostat 2015 main scenario.



The effects of demographic and democratic transitions within societies.

The situation under old pre-transitional autocracies – most component populations share similar pre-transitional demographic regime.

Pre-democratic dominant minorities can endure – Multicultural empires the historical norm: Achaemenid Iran, Ottomans, Mogul India, Manchu China, British India, Russian Empire, Hapsburgs.

Demographic and democratic transitions change all that – relative numbers become measurable and important.

Advent of democracy diminishes diversity. End of empires. Pressure on ethnic minorities, colonial minorities.

Challenges to political status quo from persistent demographic differences. 19th c. France; 20th c. Northern Ireland, 20th c. South Africa, 20th c. Serbia / Kosovo. Possibility of political violence.

Democracy and demography interact

Politicisation / falsification of the census in newly democratic multi-ethnic states: Lebanon, Macedonia, Nigeria, Romania etc.

Persistent diversity within countries problematic in intermediate stage of transition: Turkey and the Kurds.

Revanche du berceau: Quebec, Northern Ireland, Gaza.

Population pressure and the failure of the democratic transition: Youth bulges, the Arab spring, and Islam.

Demographic /political problems of semi-developed countries. The example of Turkey.

Mismatch of Turkish and Kurdish birth-rates:
regional TFR varies from 1.43 to 4.39.

Kurds 18% today; ‘majority in 2038’.


Future ethnic identification of 1.6 million
Syrian refugees unclear.

Possibly 5 million Arabs in Turkey?

Question mark over EU membership.

Regional TFR Turkey 1998-2000

recent range highest – lowest is 4.39 – 1.43



	1960	1977-1978	1982-1983	1987-1988	1992-1993	1995-1998	2000-2003	2005-2008
Urban areas	4,9		3,4		2,4	2,4	2,0	
Rural areas	6,9		5,4		3,1	3,1	2,6	
East		8,1	7,2	5,6	4,4	4,2	3,6	3,3
West		3,4	3,0	2,2	2,0	2,0	1,9	1,7
Total	6,8	5,1	4,3	3,2	2,7	2,6	2,2	2,2

Mismatched transitions and international migration


Encouragement to labour migration from pre-transitional countries to post-transitional West as Western economic growth outstrips population and workforce growth.

Later ‘replacement migration’ notions to counteract population ageing also argue for migration.

Revolutions in human rights, information and transportation create perpetual chain migration through family re-unification and transnational marriage.

Electorates in receiving countries demand controls; elite / popular divide delays response.

An example: ethnic change in the US



US ethnic voting patterns, 2012 Presidential election

	Votes according to race in the US 2012 Presidential election	
	Democrat	Republican
	(Obama)	(Romney)
All groups	52	48
All white (Incl. Hisp)	44	56
Non-Hispanic white	43	57
All non-white	89	11
Non-white (incl Hispanic)	82	18
Black	95	5

<http://www.gallup.com/poll/139880/election-polls-presidential-vote-groups.as>


But are minority issues really so different?

Policy priorities of (Hispanic) US minority voters:

- 57% education (high proportion of young people, large family size).
- 52% jobs and economy (high Hispanic unemployment, low wages).
- 43% health care.
- 37% migration. Legalisation of illegal residents (10 million).
More important for immigrant Hispanics than for US-born.


http://www.pewresearch.org/files/2014/06/FT_14.05.30_HispanicIssues.png

The position in the UK. Projections of population in the UK (millions) on different migration assumptions.



Ethnic change in the UK: percent of population in three ethnic categories 2006 – 2056. *(Coleman, Population and Development Review 2010)*

Percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2006 - 2056



United Kingdom, General Election 2010, 2015. Vote share by ethnic group (percent) . A drift to the centre?

	All Ethnic Minorities	Indian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Caribbean	African
Labour	68	61	60	72	78	87
Conservative	16	24	13	18	9	6
Liberal Democrat	14	13	25	9	12	6
Other	2	2	3	1	2	1
Khan 2015						

	All Ethnic Minorities	Asian	Black	Mixed		
Labour	53	50	67	49		
Conservative	33	38	21	26		
Liberal Democrat	5	5	3	7		
Other	8	7	6	18		
Survation for British Future 2015						
http://www.britishfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/ethnicminorityvote2015.pdf						

Policy priorities of UK ethnic minorities – not so different?

1. National Health Service
2. Economic policy
3. Immigration

Survation for Bright Blue 2015.

But: distinctive preferences of British Muslims (3 million people)

52 %: homosexuality should be illegal;

39 %: a woman should always obey her husband;

18 %: sympathise with violence against those who mock the Prophet;


4 % :sympathise with suicide bombers ‘fighting injustice’ .

66% :would not report involvement in supporting terrorism in Syria.

‘What British Muslims really think’ April 2016

Ethnic change – a general trend. Comparison of projections of foreign-origin populations in Europe (percent of total population 2000 – 2050).

Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as percent of total population.



Majority unease about migration

Majority concern about immigration rises

Elite / popular mismatch delays response

Pro-migration parties eventually lose office, or change policy.

UK 2010, 2015, Denmark, The Netherlands.

Rise of AFD, FN and other anti-migration parties.

UK EU Referendum result 2016 substantially about immigration.

Demography and the UK referendum. Ratio of 'Remain' to 'Leave'.

<https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/03/24/eu-referendum-provincial-england-versus-london-and/>

Immigration control *versus* Economic risks
Old *versus* young.

Richer AB *versus* poorer CDE 68:32.

Graduates *versus* non-graduates 70:30.

London, Scotland, N Ireland *versus* England
and Wales 60:40.

Ethnic minorities *versus* natives 68: 32 for
'Remain'.

UK EU referendum 2016 – age differences in voting intention. Source: YouGov.

	Percent in favour of:	
Age-group	Remain	Leave
18-29	73	27
30-39	62	38
40-49	48	52
50-59	45	55
60+	37	63

Will all populations end up as diverse as Western countries?

Many non-Western countries were always diverse – more like empires than nation states (India).


Others became diverse through 17th / 19th century colonial policy (Brazil, Malaysia)

Only relatively small minorities from recent 20th century immigration. 2 – 3% of populations born abroad, not increasing.

‘West’ receiving most immigrants (60%+).

Contrasts in migrant population size 1960 – 2005.

Percent of world and regional population that are international migrants, 1960 - 2005. Source: UN



Why Western diversity pattern may not be repeatable

Potential immigrant population moving to West almost inexhaustible

But supply will shift as larger non-European populations develop and attract migrants.

Western-type diversity from immigration unimaginable in China, India and other very large countries (numbers).

Can the world run out of potential migrants?

Political contrasts – can illiberal states control immigration?

Possible long term consequences

A new asymmetry in composition – diversity and mixed origin mostly in western countries.

National identity and ‘national interest’ become diffuse in West; others persist in more ‘traditional’ patterns.

More complex / difficult internal politics?

Foreign policy and minority interests – an advantage for non-Western countries?

No global ‘third demographic transition’.

Conclusions 1

Plural pre-transitional autocracies can be stable.

Mismatched demographic transitions plus democracy in plural societies create tensions; autonomy for minorities, threat to majority hegemony. Census and statistics important.

Immigration changes demographic balance, compounded by differences in demographic regime.

Conflicting policy responses to rise of immigrant minorities

- Accommodation to demands from minorities
- Demand for immigration control from majority..

International contrasts

- Changing population rank-order globally and within Europe.
- Growing international divergence in ethnic diversity.

Conclusions 2: Prospects for the longer term

Sub-replacement fertility likely to rectify itself in W. Europe, at least up to TFR 1.8+.

Population ageing will slow down, but conflicts of interest between older and young will be permanent.

International migration pressure from poorer countries, and its policy challenges, will endure without very strong policy responses.