

Population in Central and Eastern Europe: past burdens, future prospects.

A view from the 'West'.



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Questions

Why and how are Eastern and Central Europe different from the West? history geography culture economics politics

Will Central and Eastern Europe have Western European futures?

Outline

Today' s situation

Demographic characteristics and problems of CEE-
different but diverse.

Comparisons with the rest of Europe

Trends in basic indicators

Explanations 1 the background: Hajnal' s line, empires not
states, immature democracy, the state socialist
demographic regime.

Explanations 2 the legacy of communism: anomie, low
trust weak gender equity, weak freedom of information,
persistent corruption and instability, erratic policy.

The future

Central and Eastern European demographic patterns

Strong but diminishing contrasts with the ‘West’ – two ways of being European, or transient differences?

Low fertility, rapid ageing. Population decline, emigration, rural depopulation in some countries.

High but declining mortality.

Decline of marriage, rise of lone parenthood, dissolution of traditional family.

Few non-European minorities (yet), but inheritance of ancient minorities.


Premature admission to EU?

Residual political authoritarianism, corruption, instability.

All connected?

Total fertility trends, European regions, 1950 – 2012.


Sources: Eurostat, national statistical offices.



Central and Eastern Europe, Total Fertility trends 1945 – 2012.


Two convergences and a divergence.

Source: Eurostat and national statistical offices.




European Total Fertility ranking 2012.

Sources: Eurostat, national statistical data. Note: scale begins at 1.0




Mean age at first marriage (female).

Selected European countries 1946 – 2012.




Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, 1945 – 2012.




Trends in expectation of life at birth 1945-2011, males, selected European countries.

Expectation of life at birth, males, selected European countries 1945 - 2011


. Source: Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks.



Age-specific mortality rates, males, 2005-9, selected European countries (log scale).



Standardised Mortality Rates per 100,000, males aged 45-59, EU 2010. Darker = worse.




Immigration: Population born abroad 2001, 2011. OECD selected countries (thousands and percent)

	2001			2011	
	1000s	percent		1000s	percent
Australia	4482.1	23.1	Australia	6029.1	26.7
Estonia	245.3	18.0	New Zealand	1040.7	23.6
New Zealand	698.6	18.0	Canada	6933.4	20.1
Canada	5448.5	17.6	Ireland	752.5	16.8
Austria	1112.1	13.8	Austria	1349	16.0
Belgium	1112.2	10.8	Estonia	210.8	15.7
France	6260.6	10.5	Belgium	1643.6	14.9
Netherlands	1674.0	10.4	Norway	616.3	12.4
Greece	1122.9	10.3	France	7358.2	11.6
Ireland	356.0	9.2	Netherlands	1906.3	11.4
Norway	315.1	7.0	Iceland	34.7	10.9
Iceland	18.3	6.4	Italy	5457.8	9.0
Portugal	651.5	6.3	Portugal	871.8	8.3
Denmark	321.8	6.0	Denmark	441.5	7.9
Czech	448.5	4.4	Greece	750.7	6.6
Italy	2240.0	3.9	Czech	668.8	6.4
Hungary	300.1	2.9	Finland	266.1	4.9
Finland	145.1	2.8	Hungary	473.3	4.7
Slovak	119.1	2.2	Slovak	207.6	3.9
Poland	775.3	2.0	Poland	674.9	1.8


Trends in population size, Central and Eastern Europe

1990 – 2014, 1990 = 100. Source: Eurostat.



Projected percent population change 2014 – 2060, selected European countries, with and without migration.


Ranked according to population growth with migration • Source: Eurostat EUROPOP2013.



Potential support ratio (population 15-64 / population 65 and over) selected countries, 2014 – 2080. Source: Eurostat 2013

projections.

Potential Support Ratio, selected countries 2014 - 2080. Source: Eurostat 2013 projection.



Background - The Shadow of the Past

Most peoples in CE Europe belonged to someone else much of the time. Little chance to create coherent enduring nation states.

Balkans part of (Greek Orthodox) Eastern Roman Empire until 11th-15th c
(Muslim) Ottoman Empire: Balkans, most of Hungary until 18th, 19th c..

(Roman Catholic) Poland/Lithuania 1386 – 1795 incorporates W Ukraine
Belarus, Baltic States, later partitioned.

(Russian Orthodox) Russian empire competed for Poland, Baltic States,
Bulgaria, until 1918

Holy Roman Empire: Czech Lands, Poland, Eastern Baltic; Catholic /
Protestant. Swedish, Danish incursions.

Catholic Hapsburg Empire re-incorporates Hungary, Romania, 'Yugoslavia'
1699 – 1913.

Austro-Hungarian Empire Balkanised at Versailles 1919, Baltic States, Poland
independent.

Re-incorporation of Baltic States, Eastern Poland into Soviet Union 1939 – 45.

CEE become Soviet satellites 1945-48. Czech lands 'Easternised'.

CEE independence, collapse of Soviet Union and Versailles creations 1989-92.

Re-incorporation of E Germany into the West 1990, CEE into EU 2004 - , E
Ukraine into Russia (?) 2014 -

Consequences

Exclusion of part of 'Eastern Europe' from Renaissance, Reformation, democracy and free market economy until recently.

Creation of ethnically, linguistically persistently diverse populations: migration within empires, invasions, deportations, displacement.

Heavy wartime, political casualties, 24 million displaced after WW2. Post-imperial ethnic re-assortment still proceeding.

Mixed Orthodox / Catholic / Muslim / Protestant populations.


The first European Union

The Roman Empire around the time of the Emperor Trajan, 100 A.D.




The Emperor Diocletian has much to answer for.

Partition of the Roman Empire A.D. 287.




Hajnal's line (I_m 1900). Dividing a 'Western European Demographic Regime' from 'The Rest'.

Source: Coale and Watkins 1986.




I_f (index of overall fertility) in 1930 - persistent East-West contrasts (red lowest fertility, blue highest).


Source: Coale and Watkins 1996.




CEE and Western demographic contrasts, 1935




Marriage patterns, Europe around 1935



Marriage patterns, Europe c. 1935




Europe by 1970 – apparent demographic convergence of East and West



1990 – demographic divergence again.

Two-dimensional multidimensional scaling based on several demographic indicators.



Explanations?

Ancient cultural patterns

20th century legacy – state socialist regime

Poverty


Shock of transition

Anomie

Modernisation - Second demographic transition

The Iron Curtain 1945-1989 (?)

NATO - blue ; Warsaw Pact - red.



A State Socialist demographic regime

'Hyperindustrialism' / proletarianization in the command economy

State ownership of production, monopoly, 'soft' budgets, planning not market

Multi-dimensional centralism (urbanization, fusion of political and economic power)

Low income, low productivity, low personal consumption and spending power

Much of GDP to military/industrial complex. Military the only effective consumer.

Pathways to high mortality (especially late middle aged men)

Forced rural - urban migration, disruption of social contacts, family separation, stressful transit (commuting)

Residential gigantism and anonymity (new mass housing)

State trade unions, unsafe work, no independent courts

Extinction of civil society and free civic institutions, suppressed middle class.

State-sanctioned promotion of alcohol and tobacco, polluted environment.

Suppression of (adverse) demographic / medical information, no free press

Fat and vodka, minimal fruit and veg.

External locus of control, high stress.

Pathways to early and universal marriage and childbearing

Preservation of non-Western demographic regime, 'Easternisation' of former West European regime areas

State control / monopoly of housing allocation, premium on early marriage.

Family the only remaining 'private' realm.

Low wages require dual earner household, but employment secure.

Weak productivity growth requires high female workforce participation.

Birth rate supported by pronatalist policy: comprehensive early childcare, subsidies.

1989 – 92: Transitional tristesse

Political / economic turmoil and uncertainty:

Inflation, unemployment, fall in NMP / GDP, unsettled medical, welfare / pronatalist systems.

Demographic turmoil:

Surge in mortality, fall in fertility (postponement of first births, reduction of second and higher order births), marriage, more births outside marriage, emigration ('anywhere but here'), population decline.

Central and Eastern Europe: the outlook in the 21st century.

Mortality rates improving; but gap with West remains.
Fertility remains low(ish), with some improvement.
Emigration in some countries substantial, increasing in Hungary.

Family fragility continues.

‘New men’ remain rare.

Population ageing (in all) and decline (in some).

Divergence in family policy and fertility (recovery where postponement predominant) (Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Bulgaria).

Effect of economic depression 2008 – (Hungary, Latvia).

New immigration and (mostly) European minorities.

Theories

Disruption

Persistent effects of post 1989 economic, cultural moral crisis – high uncertainty, end of socialist order, enfeebled religion, anomie,. Macura 2000, Philipov 2003


Tensions between work and family life (Matysiak 2011)

‘Modernisation’

Advent of ‘Second Demographic Transition’ (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2002; Sobotka 2008), rise of consumer society.

Advent of ‘institutions of contemporary capitalism’ (Frejka 2008), but distorted espec. In FSU.

Relationship between a 'Second Demographic Transition' indicator and trend in NMP / GDP per head, 1980 – 2000.



- ◆ Belarus
- Bulgaria
- ▲ Czech Republic
- * DDR
- Estonia
- 3*Real GDP/NMP in Eastern Europe
- + 3*Real GDP/NMP Baltic States
- 3Real GDP/NMP CIS

Characteristics of high-fertility developed societies: how does CEE score?

Full long-term democracy, freedom of information, rule of law.

High levels of trust, low levels of corruption.

High GDP per head, high HDI.

Sexual equality, symmetrical gender equity.

High female workforce participation, flexible hours.

Consistent family-friendly welfare and labour market policy, early childcare, reduce family/work tension.

High level of economic equality (?).

High proportion (>30%) of births outside marriage.

What happens next?

(Demographic patterns are not just an epiphenomenon; they are profound socioeconomic indicators and also drivers of socioeconomic change).

Complete convergence across Europe?

Continued divergence within CEE?

Re-establishment of older patterns (West – East gradient)?

Disruption and instability: continued Euro crisis and recession; internal problems (in e.g. Romania, Bulgaria); aggression by Russia?